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1. Australian Discrimination Law Experts Group 
We make this submission on behalf of the undersigned members of the Australian 
Discrimination Law Experts Group (ADLEG), a group of legal academics with significant 
experience and expertise in discrimination and equality law and policy. This submission focuses 
primarily on the second exposure draft of the Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 (Cth). A 
summary of key changes from the submission made by the Australian Discrimination Law 
Experts Group on the first exposure draft of the Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 (Cth), dated 
1 October 2019, can be found on pages 4 to 8. 
We are happy to answer any questions about the submission or other related issues, or to provide 
further information on any of the areas covered. Please let us know if we can be of further 
assistance in this inquiry, by emailing liam.elphick@uwa.edu.au.  
This submission was coordinated and authored by:  
Liam Elphick, University of Melbourne; University of Western Australia 
Alice Taylor, Bond University 
Written contributions were provided by: 
Robin Banks, University of Tasmania 
Associate Professor Alysia Blackham, University of Melbourne 
Professor Beth Gaze, University of Melbourne 
Dr Sarah Moulds, University of South Australia 
Professor Simon Rice, University of Sydney 
Associate Professor Belinda Smith, University of Sydney 
Professor Margaret Thornton, Professor Emerita, Australian National University 
This submission is endorsed by:  
Robin Banks, University of Tasmania 
Associate Professor Alysia Blackham, University of Melbourne 
Liam Elphick, University of Melbourne; University of Western Australia 
Professor Beth Gaze, University of Melbourne 
Professor Beth Goldblatt, University of Technology Sydney 
Rosemary Kayess, University of New South Wales 
Dr Sarah Moulds, University of South Australia 
Associate Professor Karen O’Connell, University of Technology Sydney 
Professor Simon Rice, University of Sydney 
Associate Professor Belinda Smith, University of Sydney 
Bill Swannie, Victoria University 
Alice Taylor, Bond University 
Professor Margaret Thornton, Professor Emerita, Australian National University 
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2. Summary 
As set out in further detail below, our recommendations are as follows (all clauses refer to the 
second exposure draft of the Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 (Cth)): 
2.1 ‘STATEMENT OF BELIEF’ CLAUSES 
Recommendation 1: Clause 42 be removed. 
2.2 INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION CLAUSES 
Recommendation 2: Clauses 8(2)(d), (2)(e), (3), (4) and (5) and 32(6) (employer conduct rule 
and qualifying body rule) be removed. 
Recommendation 3: Clauses 8(6) and (7) and 32(7) (health practitioner conduct rule) be 
removed. 
2.3 RELIGIOUS BODY EXCEPTION CLAUSES 
Recommendation 4: Clause 11(1) be amended to read: ‘A religious body does not discriminate 
against a person under this Act by engaging, in good faith, in conduct that conforms to the 
doctrines, tenets, beliefs or teachings of that religion or is necessary to avoid injury to the 
religious susceptibilities of adherents of that religion.’ 
Recommendation 5: Clause 11(3) be removed. 
Recommendation 6: Clauses 11(5)(b) and (c) be removed, and replaced with: ‘any other body 
established for religious purposes (other than a body that engages solely or primarily in 
commercial activities)’. 
Recommendation 7: Clause 11(6) be removed, and replaced with: ‘Nothing in this section 
affects the operation of section 19(2) of this Act.’ 
Recommendation 8: Clauses 32(8) and (10) be removed; in the alternative, clauses 32(8) and 
(10) be amended to meet the test found in Recommendation 4. 
Recommendation 9: Clauses 33(2) and (4) be removed; in the alternative, clauses 33(2) and (4) 
be amended to meet the test found in Recommendation 4. 
2.4 OTHER MATTERS 
Recommendation 10: A definition of ‘aggrieved person’ be added to clause 5 to mean natural 
persons, and clauses 7 and 8 (substantive prohibition clauses) be amended to read: ‘A person 
discriminates against another person (‘aggrieved person’)…’. 
Recommendation 11: ‘Association’ be defined in clause 5 in identical language to the definition 
of ‘associate’ found in section 4(1) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), and the 
phrase ‘(whether as a near relative or otherwise)’ be removed from clause 9. 
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Recommendation 12: Clause 9 (discrimination against associates) be amended to read: ‘This 
Act applies to a person (‘aggrieved person’) who has an association with a person…’. 
Recommendation 13: The Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and Age Discrimination Act 2004 
(Cth) be amended to include similar protection for associates as per the test found in 
Recommendation 11.  
Recommendation 14: Further time be allowed, and proper process adopted, for consultation on 
the Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 (Cth) and the related religious freedom Bills to allow fair 
and non-discriminatory participation. 
Recommendation 15: Clause 3(2) (objects clause) be removed, and the objects clauses of the 
four existing federal discrimination laws not be amended to include reference to all human rights 
having equal status under international law. 
Recommendation 16: Clauses 11(2) and (4), 32(9) and (11), and 33(3) and (5) (preferencing of 
religious bodies) be removed. 
Recommendation 17: Clause 5(2) (overriding council by-laws) be removed. 
Recommendation 18: Legislative notes and examples that make substantive legal comments 
and clarifications be converted into substantive provisions in the Bill. 
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Table 1: A summary of key changes from the original submission made by the Australian Discrimination 
Law Experts Group on the first exposure draft of the Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 (Cth), dated 
1 October 2019: 
Clause Change in second 
exposure draft 
ADLEG 
submission 
part below 
ADLEG response 
3(2) Adds reference to ‘equal 
status’ of all human 
rights in international law 
to the ‘objects’ clause of 
the Bill (and associated 
amendments made to the 
objects clauses of the 
four existing federal 
discrimination laws) 
7.4 This will cause confusion in statutory 
interpretation, as international law makes 
clear that the right to manifest religion 
can be limited in order to secure the 
rights of others. Amendment of the 
‘objects’ clauses of the four existing 
federal discrimination laws should not be 
accomplished by a secondary piece of 
legislation in this way. 
5(1) Removes the definition 
of ‘person’ which 
included bodies corporate 
7.1 Owing to the Acts Interpretation Act 
1901 (Cth), ‘person’ under this Bill still 
includes bodies corporate and other 
organisations; such bodies should not be 
permitted to themselves bring 
discrimination claims, as human rights 
are expressly designed to protect innately 
human characteristics. 
5(1) Narrows the definition of 
‘health services’ 
5.2 The definition of ‘health services’ still 
includes the vast majority of essential 
health services in Australia. This gives an 
unprincipled privilege to health 
practitioners to refuse to provide health 
services on the basis of one protected 
attribute (religious belief or activity) over 
all others. 
5(2) Adds an explicit override 
of local government by-
laws where they prohibit 
religious activity 
7.6 This privileges one protected attribute 
(religious belief or activity) over all 
others by providing that local government 
by-laws can be overridden where they 
restrict religious belief or activity even 
where all other individuals and groups 
must comply with them. 
Australian Discrimination Law Experts Group Page 5 
Clause Change in second 
exposure draft 
ADLEG 
submission 
part below 
ADLEG response 
8(3) Broadens the scope of 
permissible employer 
conduct rules to ‘the 
course of the employee’s 
employment’ 
5.1 This slightly narrows the operation of 
clauses 8(4) and (5). However, employer 
conduct rules should instead be 
considered under the same 
‘reasonableness’ test as applies under all 
federal discrimination laws, rather than 
providing unique protection to employees 
who express religious views. 
8(4) Extends the presumption 
of unreasonableness in an 
indirect discrimination 
claim to qualifying body 
conduct rules 
5.1 Qualifying body conduct rules should be 
considered under the same 
‘reasonableness’ test as applies under
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Clause Change in second 
exposure draft 
ADLEG 
submission 
part below 
ADLEG response 
11(1), (3) Lowers the standard of 
the religious body 
exception test to only 
require that one 
individual ‘could 
reasonably consider’ the 
conduct to be in 
accordance with religious 
beliefs; and includes a 
‘religious susceptibility’ 
test in the alternative 
6.1 These provisions adopt tests with much 
lower standards than equivalent religious 
body exceptions found in other 
Australian discrimination laws. They 
except almost all conduct by all religious 
bodies from the operation of the Bill, 
thereby significantly undermining and 
frustrating its purpose (to prohibit 
religious discrimination). 
11(1), (3) Clarifies that these 
subsections do not permit 
conduct that is otherwise 
unlawful under any other 
federal law, including the 
Sex Discrimination Act 
1984 (Cth) 
6.3 This partially rectifies concerns raised 
that clause 11(5)(a) could be used to 
exclude LGBTIQ+ students from 
religious schools. Further steps should be 
taken to ensure this Bill does not confer 
any separate right on religious schools to 
discriminate against or exclude students 
on the basis of sexual orientation and/or 
gender identity. 
11(2), (4); 
32(9), (11) 
Clarifies that the Bill 
permits the giving of 
preference to persons of 
the same religion as the 
religious body 
7.5 This is unnecessary and potentially 
confusing. Clause 11 already permits the 
giving of preference to persons of the 
same religion as the religious body. 
11(5) Expands the definition of 
‘religious body’ to 
include public benevolent 
institutions, even where 
they engage solely or 
primarily in commercial 
activities 
6.2 There is no principled basis for why 
institutions with only a religious 
affiliation or connection, and which are 
responsible for providing a vast array of 
public goods and services, should be able 
to discriminate in the provision of such 
goods and services. 
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Clause Change in second 
exposure draft 
ADLEG 
submission 
part below 
ADLEG response 
32(8), (10) Adds a new exception for 
religious hospitals, aged-
care facilities and 
accommodation 
providers in relation to 
employment 
6.4 This test is very easy to satisfy, and there 
is no principled basis for why doctors, 
aged-care providers and others must have 
the same religious beliefs as the religion 
associated with the organisation. Where 
religious beliefs are relevant to a 
particular role, they will already be 
covered by the inherent requirements 
exception; where they are not relevant, 
any further exception would be an 
unwarranted limitation on freedom of 
speech, opinion and belief. 
33(2), (4) Adds a new exception for 
religious camps and 
conference sites in 
relation to 
accommodation 
6.5 The test is very easy to satisfy, and there 
is no principled basis for why those 
attending for-profit camps and 
conference sites must have the same 
religious beliefs as the religion associated 
with the camp or conference site. This 
exception is an unwarranted limitation on 
freedom of speech, opinion and belief. 
42 (and 5(1)) Includes a definition of 
‘vilify’ 
4.1 The definition of ‘vilify’ is far narrower 
than that in other discrimination laws. 
This means the exception in clause 42(2) 
is narrow and that the operation of 
clause 42(1) in overriding existing 
federal, state and territory laws is now 
even wider, further entrenching an 
objectionable hierarchy in discrimination 
protection in Australia. 
42 Clarifies that only a 
statement ‘in and of 
itself’ will override other 
discrimination laws 
4.1 This does not adequately address 
previous concerns that acts of 
discrimination connected to 
discriminatory statements could be 
considered together and rendered lawful 
by clause 42. The explanatory notes are 
not substantive law, and it remains open 
for a party to argue for an interpretation 
of ‘statement’ that encompasses conduct. 
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Clause Change in second 
exposure draft 
ADLEG 
submission 
part below 
ADLEG response 
Legislative 
notes and 
examples 
Adds a wide array of 
legislative notes and 
examples throughout the 
Bill 
7.7 The wide use of legislative notes and 
examples to make substantive legal 
clarifications is inappropriate; this 
drafting renders the Bill more complex 
and confusing, and legislative notes do 
not have the same weight in interpreting 
statutes as do substantive provisions 
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3. Introduction 
We support the prohibition of religious discrimination at the federal level through the 
introduction of ‘shield’-like protections to mirror existing federal protections for race, sex, 
disability and age. However, as noted in our original submission dated 1 October 2019, the first 
exposure draft of the Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 (Cth) went far beyond what was 
necessary to do this. This is also the case for the second exposure draft of the Religious 
Discrimination Bill 2019 (Cth) (the Bill), which retains the same key problems as the first 
exposure draft, and has introduced elements that raise new concerns and complications, 
notwithstanding some minor improvements.  
The Bill is deeply flawed as it privileges and prioritises religious belief and activity over other 
protected attributes, and overrides existing protections for women, LGBTIQ+ people, and other 
impacted groups. In doing so, it grants positive rights to individuals to harm others through 
‘sword’-like provisions. Further, in according rights to religious and corporate entities, the Bill 
also deviates from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is 
explicitly relied upon as a constitutional basis for the Bill in clause 58(a); the ICCPR, like other 
international human rights instruments, accord rights only to natural persons. 
The key concerns raised in our original submission on the first exposure draft of this Bill have 
not been adequately addressed, and in some cases have been exacerbated, while new concerns 
have now been raised by the changes made in the second exposure draft of this Bill. We are 
therefore unable to support the Bill in its present form. We propose several amendments to ensure 
the Bill aligns more closely with the standard structure and content of existing federal 
discrimination laws, and the removal of provisions that undermine existing discrimination law 
protections for other groups. 
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4. The right to make statements of belief: Clause 42 
4.1 SUBSTANTIVE OVERRIDE OF OTHER FEDERAL, STATE AND TERRITORY LAWS 
Clause 42(1)(a) of the Bill provides that ‘statements of belief’ cannot be the subject of any 
discrimination claim under any Australian discrimination laws, whether at federal, state or 
territory level. Clause 42(1)(b) provides that ‘statements of belief’ cannot be the subject of a 
claim under section 17(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas), which prohibits vilification. 
There are five main problems with clause 42. 
Firstly, while each of the four existing federal discrimination laws contain their own exceptions 
in regard to their own respective prohibited conduct, none of those laws purport to provide 
exceptions or defences to the other federal discrimination laws. Each is self-contained; for 
instance, the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (SDA) does not purport to override any 
provision of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA). This Bill departs from this 
existing practice by explicitly overriding the other four federal discrimination laws where a 
person makes a statement of belief that would otherwise be unlawful discrimination under one 
(or more) of those four federal laws. This gives an unprincipled privilege to one protected 
attribute (religious belief or activity) over all others, and creates an objectionable hierarchy in 
discrimination protection in Australia. 
Second, clause 42 is the only example of a current provision in an Australian federal 
discrimination law explicitly overriding state and territory discrimination laws in order to 
weaken their effect. Australia’s legislative framework is designed to create two concurrent 
systems of discrimination law—federal, and state/territory—that can operate alongside each 
other. This is reflected in provisions made in every federal discrimination law explicitly stating 
that they do not exclude or limit the operation of state or territory laws that are capable of 
operating concurrently.1 The existing four federal discrimination laws do not interfere with state 
and territory discrimination laws.2 This Bill differs by providing a sword to perpetrators of 
discriminatory statements to wield, thereby carving out, overriding and removing some of the 
protection afforded by state and territory discrimination laws. 
There has long been bipartisan consensus to maintain these complementary and concurrent 
federal and state/territory discrimination law systems. This approach allows claimants to pursue 
appropriate causes of action, including having the benefit of choosing proceedings in 
jurisdictions where the awarding of legal costs are the exception (as is the case in state/territory 
discrimination cases) rather than the rule (as is the case in federal discrimination cases). Once an 
 
1  Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 6A(1); Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 10(3); Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 13(3); Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) s 12(3). 
2  The sole exception is that federal disability standards prescribed under the Disability Discrimination Act 
1992 (Cth) are considered to also apply to state and territory discrimination laws unless a contrary intention 
is expressed in the particular standard: see Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) ss 13(3A), 31–34. 
However, this reflects the unique and important status of disability standards in disability discrimination law, 
and this only serves to increase protection at state and territory level. By contrast, clause 42 of the Religious 
Discrimination Bill 2019 (Cth) only serves to decrease protection at state and territory level. 
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action is pursued, the laws of that jurisdiction apply without regard to the laws of the concurrent 
jurisdiction; eg, a claim pursued through the relevant Victorian agency or tribunal under 
Victorian discrimination legislation will not be subject to federal discrimination legislation or 
jurisprudence. These concurrent systems also allow states and territories to pass laws that reflect 
their own values and principles and the needs of their communities. This balance between federal 
legislation, on the one hand, and state and territory legislation, on the other hand, would be 
thrown into disarray by clause 42. 
Third, ‘statement of belief’ is defined so widely that clause 42 would have wide-ranging 
consequences in limiting liability for discrimination, vilification, and derogatory comments 
targeting other people on the basis of their protected attributes. Clause 5(1) requires only that a 
statement be made ‘in good faith’ and that a person ‘could reasonably consider’ it to be in 
accordance with religious beliefs. This would allow a vast array of statements to be captured by 
clause 42. 
For instance, it is currently unlawful for a person in Tasmania to use a racial epithet or slur to 
offend, ridicule, insult, intimidate or humiliate another person on the basis of their race. Under 
clause 42, this behaviour would become lawful, but only for those who do so on the basis of a 
religious belief.3 Where such behaviour occurs on the basis of any other belief unrelated to 
religion, it remains unlawful, reinforcing the unprincipled privilege the Bill would give to one 
protected attribute over all others. 
The explanatory notes to the second exposure draft of the Bill provide guidance as to where the 
drafters believe that this provision would and would not apply: 
For example, a statement made in good faith by a Christian of their religious belief that 
unrepentant sinners will go to hell may constitute a statement of belief. However, a statement 
made in good faith by that same person that all people of a particular race will go to hell may not 
constitute a statement of belief as it may not reasonably be regarded as being in accordance with 
the doctrines, tenets, beliefs or teachings of Christianity.4 
However, such a statement is inconsistent with an explanation provided elsewhere in the 
explanatory notes that the definition of ‘religious belief’ is intended to not protect religions as a 
‘whole’, such as Christianity or Islam, but rather is intended to protect the beliefs and activities 
 
3  Clause 5(1) of the Bill now includes an alternative definition of ‘statement of belief’: where a good-faith 
statement is made by a person who does not hold a religious belief and this statement ‘is of a belief that a 
person who does not hold a religious belief could reasonably consider to relate to the fact of not holding a 
religious belief’. This means that a non-religious statement of belief will only be captured by clause 42 where 
the motivation behind the statement was the individual’s absence of religious beliefs. As such, all statements 
covered by clause 42 must still, in some way, relate to religious beliefs. For instance, a statement that ‘single 
mothers are evil for depriving their child of a father’ could be protected by clause 42 if either: (i) it is made 
by a person who has religious beliefs, and the belief that single mothers are evil is in accordance with their 
religious beliefs; or (2) it is made by a person who does not have religious beliefs, and the belief that single 
mothers are evil is because of their absence of religious beliefs. This statement would not be protected if 
made without regard to religion, or on the basis of any other (non-religious) beliefs or values. 
4  Explanatory Notes, Second Exposure Draft Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 (Cth) [539].  
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of different sects and denominations.5 The explanatory notes also accept that new religions may 
emerge over time.6 While a statement that persons of a particular race will go to hell may not be 
reasonably regarded as being in accordance with the doctrines, tenets, beliefs or teachings of 
Christianity generally, this cannot discount the possibility that such a statement is consistent with 
the genuine beliefs of different subsects or an ‘emerging’ religion. 
Because of the wide definition given to ‘statement of belief’, the following scenarios that are 
currently unlawful acts of discrimination under various state or territory laws would likely 
become lawful if based on a religious belief:  
• an employer telling a transgender employee that their gender identity is against the laws 
of God;  
• a childcare provider stating to a single mother that they are evil for depriving their child 
of a father; 
• a receptionist at a medical practice telling a person with a disability they have been given 
their disability by God so they can learn important lessons; and 
• a waiter in a café saying they will ‘pray for your sins’ to a gay couple. 
This will create a particularly unworkable situation for businesses in regard to employment. 
Work health and safety laws impose a positive duty on employers to prevent harm from bullying, 
harassment and discrimination,7 and discrimination laws require businesses to provide their 
services free from discrimination—yet clause 42 would authorise bullying and discrimination in 
some circumstances. The Bill would have the normative effect of providing employers, 
employees and workplace participants with a near-carte blanche right to make such statements 
so long as they are based upon a religious belief. It also reduces the already-low likelihood of 
impacted persons lodging legitimate discrimination complaints, by introducing many levels of 
complexity into the legislative scheme. 
While an exception is contained in clause 42(2) for statements which are malicious or which 
vilify others, such that those statements can be the subject of discrimination complaints, the 
scope of this exception is narrow. ‘Vilify’ has now been defined in clause 5 to mean ‘incite 
hatred or violence towards the person or group’, which is a far narrower definition of vilification 
than that adopted in any other comparable federal, state or territory law in Australia. This means 
that clause 42 in the second exposure draft of the Bill has an even wider operation in overriding 
federal, state and territory laws than the equivalent provision in the first exposure draft of the 
Bill. Because this exception departs from the terms on which there is established jurisprudence 
under vilification protections, it also adds a level of complexity to what must be proven by the 
complainant in a complaint where this defence is raised. 
 
5  Ibid [73]. 
6  Ibid [71].  
7  See generally Belinda Smith, Melanie Schleiger and Liam Elphick, ‘Preventing Sexual Harassment in Work: 
Exploring the Promise of Work Health and Safety Laws’ (2019) 32(2) Australian Journal of Labour Law 
219. 
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Fourth, clause 42(1)(c) is highly unusual in permitting the overriding of any other state and 
territory laws (ie, state and territory laws which are not discrimination laws, including laws that 
may be passed in future to respond to the needs of local communities) through regulation. An 
Act of Parliament would not be required to further extend this override. This is undemocratic, 
and is a wholly disproportionate measure that preferences religious freedom at the expense of 
state and territory laws designed to protect impacted communities from harm. 
Fifth, the second exposure draft of the Bill and the accompanying explanatory notes highlight 
that it is only statements ‘in and of themselves’ that are protected, and that any further conduct 
such as refusing to provide a service to an individual is not protected by clause 42. The term ‘in 
and of’ is ill-defined, open to judicial interpretation, and unlikely to be understood by the general 
public. This is an inadequate measure to address previous concerns that acts of discrimination 
connected to discriminatory statements may be considered together by judicial decision-makers 
under clause 42 and both the statement and the conduct be shielded from any discrimination 
claim; the explanatory notes are not the substantive law, the law will be given meaning by 
judicial interpretation, and it remains open to a party to argue for an interpretation of ‘statement’ 
that encompasses conduct. 
The amendments made since the first exposure draft of the Bill also fail to address the issue that 
organisational policies are, arguably, ‘statements’ and, as such, discriminatory policies could be 
protected under clause 42. 
4.2 PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES WITH OVERRIDE OF STATE AND TERRITORY LAWS 
There are also significant procedural issues with a federal defence applying to state- or territory-
based discrimination claims.8  
The overwhelming majority of discrimination claims are made in state and territory systems, 
rather than the federal system, largely owing to state and territory statutory authorities having a 
local presence and state and territory tribunals operating on a ‘no costs’ basis in the area of 
discrimination law. As such, a state or territory tribunal will not make an order requiring the 
unsuccessful party to pay the successful party’s legal costs, other than in exceptional 
circumstances.  
However, state and territory tribunals are not Chapter III courts under the Commonwealth 
Constitution and cannot exercise federal jurisdiction.9 A matter will involve the exercise of 
federal jurisdiction if a party has a defence that owes its existence to a law of the federal 
 
8  As noted in Simeon Beckett, ‘Key protection in religious discrimination bill is fatally flawed’, The Sydney 
Morning Herald (online at 18 September 2019) <https://www.smh.com.au/national/key-protection-in-
religious-discrimination-bill-is-fatally-flawed-20190917-p52s3n.html>. 
9  Attorney General for New South Wales v Gatsby [2018] NSWCA 254; Burns v Corbett [2018] HCA 15. See, 
eg, Commonwealth v Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (Tas) (2008) 169 FCR 85, [239] (Kenny J) (determining 
that the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal of Tasmania was not a Chapter III Court). 
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Parliament.10 The High Court of Australia thereby held in Burns v Corbett in 2018 that a state 
tribunal cannot exercise juridical power in a complaint of discrimination across a state border.11  
Clause 42 of the Bill provides a federal defence to a complaint of unlawful discrimination made 
under state or territory discrimination laws. This defence is a federal question of law that would 
involve the exercise of federal jurisdiction. As such, it is unlikely that state and territory tribunals 
will be able to determine this defence. Were a respondent to a state- or territory-based claim of 
unlawful discrimination to raise this defence in a state or territory tribunal, it seems that only a 
Chapter III court could adjudicate the defence. It is difficult to ascertain how these issues would 
then be practically resolved by a Chapter III court if the clause 42 defence was raised in a 
discrimination case in a state/territory tribunal—as above, the uniqueness of clause 42 in 
overriding state and territory laws makes this entirely new legal territory—but the three most 
likely outcomes are all problematic:  
1. Notwithstanding the jurisdictional issues identified above, the tribunal contends that it 
has jurisdiction and adjudicates the defence in any case, and is then subject to an appeal 
to a Chapter III court which overturns this finding and rules the tribunal had no such 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the defence; 
2. The tribunal accepts they do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the defence, and remits 
the defence to be raised in separate proceedings in the relevant state or territory Supreme 
Court, or the Federal Court of Australia, for adjudication; while this occurs, the state or 
territory tribunal would not be able to determine the substantive complaint of 
discrimination; or 
3. The tribunal accepts they do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate any aspect of the matter, 
as the raising of a federal defence with potential for section 109 inconsistency under the 
Commonwealth Constitution may render the entire matter a federal question of law that 
requires the exercise of federal jurisdiction, and remits the entire case to be raised in 
separate proceedings in the relevant state or territory Supreme Court, or the Federal Court 
of Australia, for adjudication. 
In each of these three scenarios, both applicants and respondents will face substantially higher 
costs, lengthy delays, and significant procedural barriers in resolving the relevant claim of 
discrimination. This is despite the fact that state and territory discrimination claims are intended 
to proceed more quickly and cheaply than other claims owing to the tribunals that hear these 
claims. As a result, whatever the outcome in these cases, clause 42 would significantly 
undermine the practical and procedural adjudication of discrimination law complaints under state 
and territory laws.12 It will also potentially increase demands on, and caseloads of, state and 
 
10  Sunol v Collier [2012] NSWCA 14, [7] (Leeming JA), citing LNC Industries Ltd v BMW (Australia) Ltd 
(1983) 151 CLR 575, 581; Felton v Mulligan (1971) 124 CLR 367, 373; British American Tobacco Australia 
Ltd v Western Australia (2003) 217 CLR 30.  
11  [2018] HCA 15. 
12  With perhaps one exception: Part 3A of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) was 
introduced in late 2018 to resolve the issue that arose in Burns v Corbett [2018] HCA 15, thereby allowing 
for the transfer of proceedings to the Local Court or District Court in New South Wales where a federal issue 
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territory Supreme Courts and the Federal Court of Australia, increasing litigation costs for 
claimants, respondents and the justice system as a whole. 
On any remaining matters regarding these procedural difficulties, we endorse the relevant section 
of the previous submission made to this consultation by the Law Council of Australia on 
3 October 2019.13 
Recommendation 1: Clause 42 be removed. 
  
 
has arisen. However, this will still require the commencement of separate proceedings for the raising of this 
clause 42 defence. 
13  Law Council of Australia, Submissions on Religious Discrimination Bill Exposure Draft (2 October 2019) 
<https://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/religious-freedom-
bills/submissions/Law%20Council%20of%20Australia.pdf> 51–54. 
Australian Discrimination Law Experts Group Page 16 
5. Prohibition of indirect discrimination: Clause 8 
5.1 EMPLOYER CONDUCT RULES AND QUALIFYING BODY RULES 
Clause 8(1) prohibits indirect discrimination on the basis of religious belief or activity, reflecting 
the structure of other federal discrimination laws by defining indirect discrimination as the 
imposition of a condition, requirement or practice which has, or is likely to have, the effect of 
disadvantaging persons who possess the protected attribute (in this case, a particular religious 
belief or activity). Clause 8(1)(c) also reflects the structure of other federal discrimination laws 
by providing a ‘reasonableness’ defence to indirect discrimination. As in other federal 
discrimination laws,14 ‘reasonableness’ is assessed in clause 8(2) by reference to a set of 
balancing factors that weigh the different and competing interests of the relevant parties: the 
nature and extent of any disadvantage resulting from the condition, requirement or practice; the 
feasibility of overcoming or mitigating this disadvantage; and the proportionality of this 
disadvantage to the result sought by the person who imposed the condition, requirement or 
practice. This is similar to proportionality exercises undertaken to balance and resolve competing 
human rights under international law. 
Under these provisions, and these provisions alone, indirect discrimination under this Bill would 
work in the same way as it does under other discrimination laws in Australia. Consider the 
example of a law firm which imposes a requirement that all employees must work between 9am 
and 1pm on Sundays. This might prima facie disadvantage those of a religious faith which 
requires or expects observance of that faith and/or attendance at religious ceremonies and events 
on Sundays. This may not be a disadvantage that can be overcome or mitigated, and it may be 
unclear why a law firm would require work to be completed in those hours when courts are not 
open on Sundays and clients are less likely to be working at that time. As such, it may be that 
this requirement is found to be unreasonable, and therefore unlawful indirect discrimination. The 
situation may be different for employers with stronger justifications for requiring work to be 
conducted on weekends, such as real estate agencies. The advantage of the general 
‘reasonableness’ test and associated balancing factors is that individual circumstances of the 
relevant parties can be taken into account and weighed against each other in coming to a decision 
on whether the condition, requirement or practice in question amounts to indirect discrimination. 
However, clauses 8(2)(d), (3) and (5) of the Bill effectively circumvent and override this general 
‘reasonableness’ defence and the associated balancing factors used to assess ‘reasonableness’. 
These clauses provide that an employer conduct rule that would restrict or prevent the expression 
of religious beliefs at a time other than in the course of an employee’s employment will be 
presumed ‘unreasonable’ for ‘relevant employers’ (those with an annual revenue over 
$50 million), unless it would cause unjustifiable financial hardship or the statement is malicious 
or would vilify a person or group. This has the effect of creating a legal presumption that 
‘employer conduct rules’ are unlawful indirect discrimination, rather than assessing this through 
 
14  See, eg, Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 7B(2). 
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the balancing factors used to assess ‘reasonableness’ under all other indirect discrimination 
claims under Australian discrimination laws. 
This type of provision (either one on ‘employer conduct rules’ or one providing a general 
presumption of unreasonableness) is not found in any other Australian discrimination law, which 
adequately address the issue through ordinary indirect discrimination provisions (including the 
‘reasonableness’ defence and associated balancing factors). While these ‘employer conduct rule’ 
provisions clearly target an Israel Folau-type situation, this situation can already be, and is more 
appropriately, captured by the ordinary indirect discrimination provisions in clauses 8(1) and (2) 
without requiring additional special provisions. Instead, the current situation under the Bill is 
that where an employer imposes a rule that restricts the expression of religious beliefs, this would 
be unlawful indirect discrimination unless the employer can prove one of two exceptions (which 
are difficult to establish, and discussed below). The obligation on employers to ensure a healthy 
and safe work environment has already been referred to in Part 4 above, and this obligation 
should not be undermined by a new and novel framing that makes the employer’s capacity to 
fulfil this obligation more difficult. 
Under clauses 8(2)(d), (3) and (5), statements on the basis of religious belief would have greater 
protection from employer intervention than a statement made for any other reason. For 
employers, it would mean that measures to protect their reputation through codes of conduct 
would need to be applied differently in respect of employees making statements on the basis of 
religious belief and employees making statements on some other basis, such as a social, cultural, 
political, scientific, or considered belief.   
For example, a ‘relevant employer’ might impose a rule that bans employees from engaging 
publicly in controversial political debates. If a gay employee is restricted by this rule from 
publicly supporting marriage equality as a result, they could argue an indirect discrimination 
case under the SDA, but the rule will be lawful if the employer can establish that the rule was 
‘reasonable’ based on the balancing factors. Differently, a religious employee in the same 
situation (for instance, an employee restricted from publicly opposing marriage equality on the 
basis of their religious beliefs) could argue an indirect discrimination case under the proposed 
Religious Discrimination Act, and the rule would be presumed unlawful unless the employer can 
prove one of two exceptions made available. These exceptions require an employer to prove that 
the employer conduct rule is ‘necessary’ to avoid unjustifiable financial hardship (clause 8(3)), 
or that the statement made by the employee is malicious or would, or be likely to, harass, 
threaten, seriously intimidate or vilify another person or group (clause 8(5)). Both exceptions set 
very high standards of proof, which are much harder to prove than the general standard of 
‘reasonableness’ found in all other federal indirect discrimination prohibitions. As such, an 
employer is unlikely to be able to establish either of these exceptions in most cases. 
The Bill’s presumption of unreasonableness in indirect discrimination claims has also, in 
clauses 8(2)(e) and (4) of the second exposure draft of the Bill, now been extended to qualifying 
body conduct rules. ‘Qualifying bodies’ include legal admission boards, medical boards, 
universities and TAFEs, among other bodies. For the reasons given above, this is both 
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unnecessary and objectionable for providing unique protection to members of qualifying bodies 
who express religious views, and not any other views. 
As a matter of equality, there should not be one rule for indirect discrimination on the basis of 
race, sex, disability and age, and another rule for indirect discrimination on the basis of religion. 
Employer conduct rules should be considered under the same ‘reasonableness’ test in all federal 
discrimination laws. 
As clause 32(6) refers to employer conduct rules in assessing inherent requirements, this should 
also be removed if the employer conduct rule provisions in clause 8 are removed.  
Recommendation 2: Clauses 8(2)(d), (2)(e), (3), (4) and (5) and 32(6) be removed. 
5.2 HEALTH PRACTITIONER CONDUCT RULES 
Clauses 8(6) and (7) provide that rules that require health practitioners to provide a health service 
to which they object on the basis of a religious belief or activity are presumed to be unreasonable, 
and are therefore acts of unlawful indirect discrimination. These provisions pertain to rules 
imposed by health service providers, or any other individuals who are able to impose rules of 
conduct on health practitioners. 
The breadth of these provisions could allow health practitioners to lawfully refuse to provide a 
range of health services, including women’s reproductive health services, reproductive health 
services for people with disabilities, transgender health services, and other services for 
LGBTIQ+ patients. This limitation could also apply to any treatments that involve the use of 
certain animal by-products, stem cells or treatments that had, at a research stage, involved stem 
cells where the use of such products or procedures are in conflict with a health practitioner’s 
religious beliefs. While the definition of ‘health services’ in clause 5 has been narrowed since 
the first exposure draft, the definition still includes the vast majority of essential health services 
in Australia. 
Clauses 8(6) and (7) are unique in the federal discrimination law landscape, and indeed in 
discrimination law across Australia. This ‘protection’ for the religious sensitivities of health 
practitioners would only exist on the basis of religious belief or activity, and no other attribute. 
This gives an unprincipled privilege to one protected attribute (religious belief or activity) over 
all others, and creates an objectionable hierarchy in discrimination protection in Australia. The 
effect is that a health practitioner who opposes abortion on the basis of a religious belief could 
claim unlawful discrimination if an employer or health services provider required them to 
provide abortion-related services, while a health practitioner who opposes abortion on the basis 
of a personal non-religious belief could not. 
A consequence of this provision is that organisations that provide health services will, in some 
circumstances, be forced to engage in unlawful discrimination. For instance, an individual 
pharmacist working at a pharmacy could refuse to provide ‘puberty blocker’ medication to a 
transgender customer on the basis of their own religious beliefs, despite being asked to provide 
them to transgender people by the pharmacy owner. Assuming the individual pharmacist is 
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captured by clause 8(7), which appears likely, this would mean the pharmacy owner would face 
an impossible choice: require the pharmacist to provide the prescribed medication to the 
transgender customer and be subject to a religious discrimination claim by the pharmacist; or 
allow the pharmacist to refuse to provide the prescribed medication to the transgender customer 
and be subject to a gender identity discrimination claim by the customer under the SDA. This is 
an unconscionable burden for legislation to impose on business owners and health professionals 
with ethical obligations to those seeking medical help, and is a wholly disproportionate measure 
to protect religious freedom. One fundamental tenet of the rule of law is that laws need to be 
drafted so that people are able to comply with them; this Bill, in some cases, would not allow 
organisations to comply with legal obligations to both their workers and to their customers. 
In another example a rural town may have one general practitioner, who refuses to discuss or 
perform certain reproductive health services for a patient, for example prescribing the morning-
after pill, and refuses to refer the patient to another doctor. Although some state or territory laws 
may require the doctor to refer them onwards, the effect of clauses 8(6) and (7) could be to 
override those provisions. In any case, there may be limited referral options in the particular rural 
area, leaving the patient without recourse. On a practical level, clauses 8(6) and (7) signal to 
health practitioners that they are protected in such circumstances. Existing legal requirements 
that protect the rights of patients—including, for example, the Australian Charter of Healthcare 
Rights—could be undermined and subject to challenge. 
Although exceptions are provided in clauses 8(7)(a) and (b), these set very high standards of 
proof: requiring that the rule in question is necessary to avoid an ‘unjustifiable adverse impact’ 
on either: (a) the ability of the person imposing the rule to provide the health service; or (b) on 
the health of any person who would otherwise be provided with that health service. The use of 
both ‘necessary’ and ‘unjustifiable’ standards means that health service providers are unlikely to 
meet either of these exceptions in most cases. 
The clarifications that have been added to clauses 8(6) and (7), such that health practitioners are 
only permitted to object to particular procedures rather than particular patients or groups of 
patients, have been added as legislative notes, which for reasons noted below in Part 7.7 is 
inadequate. Even if the clarifications were in the legislation, as they ought be, in some instances 
it is impossible to separate a particular procedure from a particular group of patients; only 
transgender patients are likely to undertake sex reassignment procedures or seek access to 
puberty blocking medications, while women will predominantly affected by refusals to provide 
female reproductive health procedures. Indeed, the new drafting of clauses 8(6) and (7) may even 
encourage health practitioners to implement blanket bans on certain procedures, rather than 
holding more nuanced or principled positions, since blanket bans are more likely to be lawful 
under these provisions. A health practitioner refusing to prescribe contraception to all customers 
is more likely to be protected by clauses 8(6) and (7) than a health practitioner only refusing to 
prescribe contraception to single women. 
As such, this clarification does not significantly change the above objections to clauses 8(6) 
and (7), nor does it change, for instance, the outcome of the pharmacy example given above. 
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These provisions remain deeply problematic for the reasons given. Further, these provisions are 
not found in any other Australian discrimination law. 
Clause 32(7) refers to health practitioner conduct rules in assessing inherent requirements; this 
should also be removed if the health practitioner conduct rule provisions in clause 8 are removed. 
Recommendation 3: Clauses 8(6) and (7) and 32(7) be removed. 
  
Australian Discrimination Law Experts Group Page 21 
6. Religious body exceptions: Clause 11 
6.1 TEST FOR RELIGIOUS BODY EXCEPTION 
Clause 11 of the Bill provides that a religious body does not discriminate under any provision of 
the Bill if they engage either: 
• ‘in good faith, in conduct that a person of the same religion as the religious body could 
reasonably consider to be in accordance with the doctrines, tenets, beliefs or teachings of 
that religion’: clause 11(1); or 
• ‘in good faith, in conduct to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of adherents of 
the same religion as the religious body’: clause 11(3). 
This would allow religious bodies to discriminate against people of other religious beliefs or 
faiths, or against people of no religious beliefs or faith. 
Only one of the above tests needs to be met in order for the conduct to be lawful under the Bill. 
Clause 11(1) is unorthodox, extremely wide in scope, and far easier to satisfy than any religious 
body exception test found in any other federal, state or territory discrimination law in Australia. 
This significantly undermines the purpose of the Bill—to prohibit religious discrimination—by 
providing a much wider exception than seen in other comparable discrimination laws. 
Clause 11(1) will, in effect, allow a religious body to escape liability for an otherwise unlawful 
act of religious discrimination where they can establish that a single person of the same religion 
as the body could reasonably consider the act to be in accordance with the beliefs of that religion. 
The religious body would not be required to establish any recognised religious or doctrinal basis 
for its act—even in relation to adducing evidence from a single individual adherent of the same 
faith. The religious body would not be required to establish that the individual agreed the act was 
in accordance with the beliefs of that religion. Rather, the religious body would only need to 
establish that an individual—any individual—might consider the act, reasonably, to be in 
accordance with the beliefs of that religion. The bar set by this test is so low as to be entirely 
ineffective. It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine an act by a religious body which would 
not fall within the scope of clause 11(1), and therefore be excluded from the operation of the 
Bill. 
Clause 11(3) adds an alternative test which religious bodies can satisfy in order to be excepted 
from the Bill. However, despite the assertion in the ‘summary of amendments’ document 
(released with the Bill) that the addition of clause 11(3) in the second exposure draft of the Bill 
‘aligns with existing provisions in the … SDA’, clause 11(3) provides a weaker test than the 
relevant SDA test. While section 37(1)(d) of the SDA provides an exception where conduct ‘is 
necessary to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of adherents of that religion’, clause 
11(3) omits that the conduct be ‘necessary’. Rather, the conduct must only, in fact, be ‘to avoid 
injury to the religious susceptibilities of adherents’. This, again, lowers the bar of this test 
significantly; it is misleading to suggest this test ‘aligns’ with existing SDA provisions. 
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As religious discrimination is not currently prohibited by federal law, it may be suggested that 
the effect of clauses 11(1) and (3) is simply to continue the status quo for religious bodies, such 
that conduct they currently engage in lawfully will remain lawful if this Bill becomes law. This 
ignores the operation of existing protections against discrimination on the ground of religion in 
all state and territory discrimination laws (except for New South Wales and South Australia). 
Were clauses 11(1) and (3) in their current form to become law, there could be a potential 
argument under section 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution that state and territory laws 
which do not provide as wide an exception for religious bodies would be rendered invalid to the 
extent they are inconsistent with clauses 11(1) and (3). This would have the effect of rendering 
lawful a far wider range of conduct by religious bodies than is currently deemed unlawful under 
state and territory laws. As most discrimination claims proceed to state and territory authorities, 
this could significantly weaken existing protection for individuals against religious 
discrimination. Further, even if this were not the case, to exclude such a significant array of 
conduct from the operation of this Bill would undermine and frustrate the very purpose of the 
Bill: to prohibit religious discrimination. The Bill may, in its current form, permit more 
discrimination than it prohibits. 
Equivalent religious body exceptions at the federal, state and territory level require that conduct 
‘conforms to’ religious doctrine or ‘is necessary to avoid injury to’ religious susceptibilities.15 
The test provided in this Bill should be amended to reflect the equivalent standards set by other 
Australian discrimination laws. There is no principled basis on which a far lower standard should 
be set for religious bodies in this Bill, nor for weakening the standard set by other Australian 
discrimination laws, which still allow some religious activities to be excepted from prohibitions 
on discrimination in recognition of a religious body’s right to exercise their religious freedom in 
relation to core activities and doctrine.  
Setting a lower standard in this Bill could also provide a precedent for the Australian Law 
Reform Commission (ALRC), in its current inquiry on religious exceptions, to recommend the 
same lower standard be adopted in other federal discrimination laws.16 Indeed, the President of 
the ALRC noted in Senate Estimates in October 2019 that, ‘what we’ve been asked to do [now] 
is restrict ourselves to a drafting exercise which would ensure that the Sex Discrimination Act 
and the Fair Work Act were consistent with the government’s bill.’17 If the SDA and Fair Work 
 
15  Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 37(1)(d); Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) s 35. No such religious 
exceptions exist in the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) or the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth). 
On state laws, see, eg, Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 56(d); Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) s 
52(d). 
16  Attorney-General for Australia, The Hon. Christian Porter MP, Review into the Framework of Religious 
Exemptions in Anti discrimination Legislation (Media Release, 10 April 2019) 
<https://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Media/Pages/Review-into-the-Framework-of-Religious-Exemptions-
in-Anti-discrimination-Legislation-10-april-19.aspx>; 
17  Parliament of Australia, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee: Estimates, 
‘Attorney-General’s Portfolio: Australian Law Reform Commission’ (22 October 2019) 
<https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=COMMITTEES;id=committees%2Fe
stimate%2F2d5584b3-e781-4bb0-8723-
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Act 2009 (Cth) were to be amended to adopt the tests in clauses 11(1) and (3), to thereby make 
them ‘consistent’ with the Bill, this would significantly weaken existing protections on the basis 
of sex, pregnancy, sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status and other attributes, and 
would provide religious bodies a vastly wider scope than currently exists to discriminate on those 
grounds. 
Recommendation 4: Clause 11(1) be amended to read: ‘A religious body does not 
discriminate against a person under this Act by engaging, in good faith, in conduct that 
conforms to the doctrines, tenets, beliefs or teachings of that religion or is necessary to 
avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of adherents of that religion.’ 
Recommendation 5: Clause 11(3) be removed. 
6.2 DEFINITION OF ‘RELIGIOUS BODY’ 
The definition of ‘religious body’ in clause 11(5) of the Bill has been expanded to now include 
registered benevolent institutions conducted in accordance with religious beliefs, as well as 
religious educational institutions and any other body conducted in accordance with religious 
beliefs. 
As per the explanatory notes,18 the purpose of the inclusion of registered public benevolent 
institutions is because such bodies have a main purpose of ‘relieving poverty or distress’. Such 
a purpose is described by the explanatory notes as ‘commonly inspired by religious faith.’ 
Registered public benevolent institutions are captured by clause 11 even where they engage 
solely or primarily in commercial activities; no principled basis has been provided as to why this 
should be the case. 
Other religious charities continue to be covered by the Bill through clause 11(5)(c), so long as 
they are ‘conducted in accordance with a particular religion’. Thus, such organisations will be 
religious charities even if their purposes are ‘advancing health or advancing social or public 
welfare’. Various Australian charities that provide a vast array of public services and benefits 
would be caught by this definition. Clause 11 would allow them to discriminate widely, in ways 
that non-religious charities could not. This would exacerbate what is already an uneven playing 
field in the various industries and markets in which not-for-profit organisations compete. This is 
made more problematic by the inclusion of registered public benevolent bodies, as this now 
includes an even wider array of important organisations that provide various public goods and 
services. 
Take for example a soup kitchen affiliated to one particular religion. Clause 11 would allow the 
soup kitchen to require that any volunteer helping serve bowls of soup is of the same religion. It 
would also allow the soup kitchen to refuse to serve soup to any persons who are of a different 
 
2e92f87b00ee%2F0003;query=Id%3A%22committees%2Festimate%2F2d5584b3-e781-4bb0-8723-
2e92f87b00ee%2F0000%22>. 
18  Explanatory Notes, Second Exposure Draft Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 (Cth) [221]–[222]. 
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religious faith, or of no religious faith, or to require recipients to participate in religious activities 
in order to receive food. Similarly, a homeless shelter could refuse to provide shelter to a person 
who did not have the same religious beliefs.  
Religiously affiliated charities and public benevolent institutions are already captured by other 
relevant exceptions in the Bill: the governing rules of charities, and conduct engaged in to give 
effect to such rules, are excepted under clause 29; and religious discrimination is permitted in 
employment where, because of religious belief or lack thereof, a person is unable to carry out 
the inherent requirements of the job under clause 32(2). The latter would also allow religious 
charities and public benevolent institutions to employ applicants of the same faith for roles in 
which faith is relevant: for instance, leadership roles. 
While there may be a basis for the clause 11 exception for those charities that are expressly 
established for a religious purpose, there appears to be no basis for extending this exception to 
charities or public benevolent institutions with a religious affiliation or connection, where their 
main purpose is to provide public goods, services or facilities such as food or shelter. 
Equivalent religious body exceptions in other federal discrimination laws apply only to ‘bodies 
established for religious purposes’.19 This Bill should be amended along similar lines. 
Organisations that engage solely or primarily in commercial activities should not be granted a 
carte blanche exception from the operation of this Bill solely by reason of having a connection 
with a particular religion. 
While hospitals, aged-care facilities and accommodation providers have now been explicitly 
excluded from clause 11, their separate inclusion in clause 32 is dealt with in Part 6.4 below. 
Recommendation 6: Clauses 11(5)(b) and (c) be removed, and replaced with: ‘any other 
body established for religious purposes (other than a body that engages solely or primarily 
in commercial activities)’. 
6.3 SCOPE OF RELIGIOUS SCHOOL EXCEPTION 
The clause 11(5)(a) exclusion applies to all conduct engaged in by religious educational 
institutions. For instance, a student may join a religious school in Year 1 and at the time be of 
the school’s faith. Halfway through Year 12, that student may decide they do not identify 
strongly with that religion anymore. Clauses 11(1) and (5)(a) would allow the school to expel 
that student on the basis that they do not share the same religious beliefs as the school. By 
contrast, equivalent provisions in Tasmanian, Queensland, Northern Territory and Australian 
Capital Territory laws allow schools to discriminate on the ground of religion at the time of 
admission—ie, their first enrolment at that school—but not once a student is a member of the 
school community.20 
 
19  Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 37(1)(d); Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) s 35. 
20  Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) ss 51A(2), (3); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 41(a); 
Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s 46; Anti-Discrimination Act 1992 (NT) s 30(2). 
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Religiously affiliated educational institutions are already dealt with by other relevant exceptions 
in the Bill: for example, religious discrimination is permitted in employment where, because of 
religious belief or lack thereof, a person is unable to carry out the inherent requirements of the 
job under clause 32(2). This would already allow religious schools to employ applicants of the 
same faith for roles in which faith is relevant. To the extent that religious schools are permitted 
to preference students of the same faith, this should only apply at the stage of admission and not 
at any later stage, owing to the disproportionate adverse effect this will have on students in later 
years of schooling as they develop their own sense of identity. As such, clause 11 should be 
amended to ensure the religious school exception applies only at the stage of admission. This 
can be done by drawing on clause 19 of the Bill, which already separates the prohibition on 
discrimination in education into: (i) the stage of admission to the school in clause 19(1); and (ii) 
post-admission in clause 19(2). Clause 11 should not apply to clause 19(2), thereby maintaining 
the prohibition on post-admission discrimination against students. 
Clause 11(6) provides that ‘[t]his section applies despite anything else in this Act’. This is 
unnecessary if the intention is to ensure that conduct captured by clause 11 is not unlawful 
discrimination under the Bill; clauses 11(1) and (3), and our amendment in Recommendation 4, 
already provide that ‘[a] religious body does not discriminate against a person under this Act 
by…’. This is all that is necessary for such conduct to be excepted from the prohibitions on 
discrimination contained in the Bill. Instead, clause 11(6) should be replaced with a provision to 
the effect that clause 11 is subject to clause 19(2), such that post-admission religious 
discrimination against students by religious schools is not permissible. 
Clauses 11(1) and (3) have been clarified so that they do not permit conduct that is otherwise 
unlawful under any other federal law, including the SDA. This partially rectifies concerns 
previously raised that clause 11(5)(a) could be used to exclude LGBTIQ+ students from religious 
schools on the basis that LGBTIQ+ students may not be not acting in accordance with the beliefs 
of their particular school/s. However this should also be made clear through any amendments 
that result from the current ALRC inquiry into religious educational institution exceptions 
contained in the SDA.21 One key term of reference for that review is the consideration of what 
reforms should be made in order to ‘limit or remove altogether (if practicable) religious 
exemptions to prohibitions on discrimination, while also guaranteeing the right of religious 
institutions to conduct their affairs in a way consistent with their religious ethos’.22 The federal 
government has repeatedly stated publicly that it wants to, and will, remove existing exemptions 
that allow religious schools to expel gay students.23 Steps must be taken to ensure this Bill does 
not confer any separate right on religious schools to effectively discriminate against students on 
 
21  Attorney-General for Australia, The Hon Christian Porter MP, Review into the Framework of Religious 
Exemptions in Anti-discrimination Legislation (Media Release, 10 April 2019) 
<https://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Media/Pages/Review-into-the-Framework-of-Religious-Exemptions-
in-Anti-discrimination-Legislation-10-april-19.aspx>; see Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 38. 
22  Ibid. 
23  Paul Karp, ‘Scott Morrison will change the law to ban religious schools expelling gay students’, The 
Guardian (online at 13 October 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/oct/13/morrison-
caves-to-labor-on-gay-students-in-discrimination-law-reform-push>. 
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the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Not only would this defeat the purpose of 
the outcomes of the ALRC inquiry, this would create procedural difficulties where an applicant 
lodges a discrimination claim under the SDA and the respondent raises a defence under a 
separate federal discrimination law (the proposed Religious Discrimination Act). This would 
create a conflict between two federal laws which can only be resolved judicially at the expense 
of parties to a complaint. 
Recommendation 7: Clause 11(6) be removed, and replaced with: ‘Nothing in this section 
affects the operation of section 19(2) of this Act.’ 
6.4 RELIGIOUS HOSPITALS, AGED-CARE FACILITIES AND ACCOMMODATION PROVIDERS 
A separate exception has been added to the second exposure draft of the Bill in clause 32(8) and 
(10), allowing religious hospitals, aged-care facilities and accommodation providers to 
discriminate on the basis of religious belief or activity in employment. The tests provided in 
clauses 32(8) and (10) are the same tests found in clauses 11(1) and (3), requiring a very low 
standard of proof. This could allow, for instance, a religious hospital to sack a doctor who 
expresses pro-choice views; it could allow a religious aged-care facility to refuse to hire an 
atheist care worker.  
There is no rational basis for requiring doctors, aged-care workers or employees at 
accommodation providers to express the same religious beliefs and practices as the religion to 
which their employer is associated. The requirement is an unwarranted limitation on freedom of 
speech, opinion and belief. These are organisations primarily conducted for commercial 
purposes or for health- or welfare-related purposes. They should not be subject to special 
exceptions. Healthcare and accommodation should be provided by those individuals who are 
best equipped to provide it, on the basis of merit. Where religious beliefs or activity are relevant 
in particular roles at religious hospitals, aged-care facilities and accommodation providers, they 
will already be covered by the inherent requirements exception in clause 32(2) such that these 
organisations can discriminate on the basis of religious belief or activity. Where they are not 
relevant, they should be subject to the same prohibition on religious discrimination as non-
religious hospitals, aged care facilities and accommodation providers. 
Recommendation 8: Clauses 32(8) and (10) be removed; in the alternative, clauses 32(8) 
and (10) be amended to meet the test found in Recommendation 4. 
6.5 RELIGIOUS CAMPS AND CONFERENCE SITES 
Similarly, a separate exception has been added to the second exposure draft of the Bill in 
clause 33(2) and (4), allowing religious camps and conference sites to discriminate on the basis 
of religious belief or activity in the provision of accommodation. The tests provided in 
clauses 33(2) and (4) are the same tests found in clauses 11(1) and (3), requiring a very low 
standard of proof. This could allow, for instance, a for-profit camp or conference site to refuse 
to hire the facilities to a healthcare conference on female reproductive health, or for an LGBTIQ 
youth suicide prevention camp. One difference with this exception is the requirement for conduct 
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to be ‘in accordance with a publicly available policy issued by the [relevant] person’: 
clauses 33(2)(c) and (4)(c). 
For the same reasons as noted in Part 6.4 above, it is unclear why accommodation at 
commercially operated religious camps and conference sites needs to be provided only to those 
who express the same religious beliefs and practices as the religion with which the camp or 
conference site is associated. 
Recommendation 9: Clauses 33(2) and (4) be removed; in the alternative, clauses 33(2) and 
(4) be amended to meet the test found in Recommendation 4.  
  
Australian Discrimination Law Experts Group Page 28 
7. Other matters 
7.1 EXTENSION OF BILL TO BODIES CORPORATE 
We endorse fully the previous submission made to this consultation by the Australian Human 
Rights Commission (AHRC) on 27 September 2019 in regard to concerns over the extension of 
this Bill to allow bodies corporate to bring claims of religious discrimination.24  
Owing to the inability of bodies corporate to be characterised in a manner pertaining to sex, race, 
age or disability, all existing federal discrimination laws allow only natural persons to bring a 
claim of discrimination. This is the case without requiring specific definitions of ‘person’ in 
those laws, owing solely to the limited character that organisations can take. However, bodies 
corporate can indeed be characterised in a ‘religious’ manner. With the previous definition of 
‘person’ in clause 5 to include bodies corporate being removed in the second exposure draft of 
the Bill, ‘person’ then falls to be defined by the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) owing to 
statutory interpretation principles. Section 2C of that Act establishes that any reference to 
‘person’ in a federal Act ‘include[s] a body politic or corporate as well as an individual.’ Because 
clauses 7 and 8 of the Bill provide that a person can discriminate against ‘another person’, this 
means that religious bodies corporate and other bodies with a religious character can bring claims 
for religious discrimination under the Bill. This is also expressly acknowledged in the 
explanatory notes: ‘the Act does not preclude bodies corporate or other non-natural persons from 
being “persons aggrieved” for the purposes of the AHRC Act in appropriate cases.’25 As such, 
the removal of ‘person’ from clause 5 has no operative effect, and further definitions must be 
included to clarify that only natural persons can make discrimination complaints. 
Human rights are expressly designed to protect innately human characteristics. While bodies 
corporate and other organisations should, consistent with other federal discrimination laws, be 
prohibited from engaging in discriminatory conduct, such bodies should not be permitted to 
themselves bring a claim of discrimination. 
Recommendation 10: A definition of ‘aggrieved person’ be added to clause 5 to mean 
natural persons, and clauses 7 and 8 (substantive prohibition clauses) be amended to read: 
‘A person discriminates against another person (‘aggrieved person’)…’. 
7.2 EXTENSION OF PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATION TO ASSOCIATES 
Clause 9 of the second exposure draft of the Bill extends the existing prohibition on 
discrimination to associates. This is a not uncommon protection in discrimination laws, and is 
contained in near-identical language in the DDA,26 and in different language in the Racial 
 
24  Australian Human Rights Commission, Religious Freedom Bills: Submission to the Attorney-General’s 
Department (27 September 2019) <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/legal/submission/religious-
freedom-bills> 15–18. 
25  Explanatory Notes, Second Exposure Draft Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 (Cth) [64]–[66]. 
26  Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 7. 
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Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (RDA).27 Based on the examples given in the explanatory notes,28 
this brings the provision into line with established drafting of discrimination laws. However, 
several clarifications should be made. 
Firstly, ‘associate’ is not defined in the Bill; the only guidance provided is in clause 9 itself, 
providing that an association can be ‘as a near relative or otherwise’. This is vague and will lead 
to confusion. The DDA represents best practice in defining ‘associates’ to include spouses, 
persons living together on a genuine domestic basis, relatives, carers, and persons in business, 
sporting or recreational relationships.29 This definition should be adopted in the Bill. 
Second, for the reasons explained in Part 7.1 above, the Bill currently permits bodies corporate 
and other organisations to bring claims of discrimination. The recommendation in Part 7.1 does 
not address associates. As such, clause 9 should also be clarified to ensure bodies corporate and 
other organisations cannot bring claims of discrimination owing to an association with a natural 
person. 
Third, the SDA and Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) (ADA) currently do not extend the 
prohibition on discrimination to associates. If the Bill is to contain such a prohibition, then 
similar amendments should be made to the SDA and ADA to the same effect. There is no 
principled basis on which discrimination in relation to associates should be prohibited on the 
basis of religious belief or activity, but not age, sex, or the other grounds enumerated in the SDA.  
Recommendation 11: ‘Association’ be defined in clause 5 in identical language to the 
definition of ‘associate’ found in section 4(1) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), 
and the phrase ‘(whether as a near relative or otherwise)’ be removed from clause 9. 
Recommendation 12: Clause 9 (discrimination against associates) be amended to read: 
‘This Act applies to a person (‘aggrieved person’) who has an association with a person…’. 
Recommendation 13: The Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and Age Discrimination Act 
2004 (Cth) be amended to include similar protection for associates as per the test found in 
Recommendation 11. 
7.3 ACCESSIBILITY OF CONSULTATION 
We are aware of a number of concerns that have been raised concerning the accessibility of the 
consultation process generally, and in particular for people with disabilities, people from 
culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds, and people with literacy difficulties, many of 
whom are personally affected by discrimination. These concerns include lack of time, lack of 
clear explanatory materials, lack of accessible format materials for people with cognitive 
impairments or limited English language reading skills (including audio format materials), and 
lack of opportunity to speak and be heard. These shortcomings have excluded people with 
 
27  Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) ss 5, 11–15. 
28  Explanatory Notes, Second Exposure Draft Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 (Cth) [195]. 
29  Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 4(1). 
Australian Discrimination Law Experts Group Page 30 
disability and others from this consultation process and, as a result, made the process 
discriminatory on the basis of, at least, race, age, disability and family responsibilities. This 
requires an extension of time and the adoption of established law reform processes, in order to 
ensure fair and non-discriminatory participation. 
Recommendation 14: Further time be allowed, and proper process adopted, for 
consultation on the Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 (Cth) and the related religious 
freedom Bills to allow fair and non-discriminatory participation. 
7.4 AMENDMENT OF ‘OBJECTS’ CLAUSES  
The Human Rights Legislation Amendment (Freedom of Religion) Bill amends the objects 
clauses of all four federal discrimination laws to include reference to the importance of ‘all’ 
human rights. The explanatory notes provide that this will ensure freedom of religion, among 
other rights, is given appropriate regard in discrimination law.30 Clause 3(2)(a) of the second 
exposure draft of the Religious Discrimination Bill also now includes reference to all human 
rights having equal status in international law. These changes are not necessary and have no 
substantive effect. 
At present only the SDA, of the federal suite of discrimination laws, refers to giving effect to a 
United Nations (UN) convention in its objects, although some of the other federal discrimination 
laws refer to UN conventions for the purposes of establishing constitutional power to legislate. 
The aims and purpose of clause 3(2) of the Bill are unclear, and its effect will be to cause 
confusion in statutory interpretation.  
The ICCPR, relied upon as a constitutional basis of the Bill in clause 58(a), makes it clear in 
article 18 that the right to manifest religion can be limited in order to secure the rights of others; 
the non-discrimination rights in articles 2 and 26 cannot be limited in that way. The Bill is 
inconsistent in relying on international conventions, but then departing from their formulations 
in matters of substance and the balancing of competing rights.  
In Maloney v The Queen,31 the High Court of Australia held that in so far as the RDA referred 
to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
meaning of its provisions was taken to be as at the date of Australia’s ratification in 1975. This 
raises further questions about what the references to international human rights law in 
clause 3(2), and subsequent amendments to the other federal discrimination laws, might mean.  
Further, the significant step of including an objects clause in the other four federal discrimination 
laws should not be accomplished by a secondary piece of legislation in this way. It should be the 
subject of adequate primary consultation. The rationale given in the explanatory notes for this 
inclusion has nothing to do with race, sex, disability or age discrimination law and is concerned 
 
30  Explanatory Notes, Second Exposure Draft Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 [52]–[55]. 
31  Maloney v The Queen (2013) 352 CLR 168. 
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only with religious freedom. It fails to consider what if any might be the impact on the other four 
federal discrimination laws of adopting this clause.  
Recommendation 15: Clause 3(2) be removed, and the objects clauses of the four existing 
federal discrimination laws not be amended to include reference to all human rights having 
equal status under international law. 
7.5 PREFERENCING BY RELIGIOUS BODIES 
The second exposure draft of the Bill, in clauses 11(2) and (4), 32(9) and (11), and 33(3) and (5) 
expressly clarifies that a religious body is permitted to give preference to persons of the same 
religion as the religious body. 
This is unnecessary: the scope of clause 11 already permits such preferencing through excepting 
a religious body from all prohibitions on discrimination contained in the Bill. This is done 
through positive language, and would be the same if the clause 11 test were to be modified to 
meet the SDA test as recommended. Including clauses 11(2) and (4) and 32(9) and (11) only 
serves to further complicate an already complex Bill. 
Recommendation 16: Clauses 11(2) and (4), 32(9) and (11), and 33(3) and (5) be removed. 
7.6 OVERRIDING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT BY-LAWS 
The second exposure draft of the Bill includes a new clause 5(2) which provides that an activity 
is not unlawful merely because a local government by-law prohibits the activity. This is 
unorthodox, and would mean that local government by-laws that prevent or restrict religious 
activities can be susceptible to challenge. This would have the effect of overriding existing legal 
protections and privileging one protected attribute (religious belief or activity) over others. For 
instance, street preachers denied permits by local government authorities could sue for religious 
discrimination, even if their religious activities would contravene local by-laws with which all 
other individuals and groups must comply. Local governments may also be unable to impose 
existing noise restrictions on noise caused by religious observance or ceremonies.32  
Recommendation 17: Clause 5(2) be removed. 
7.7 USE OF LEGISLATIVE NOTES AND EXAMPLES 
The second exposure draft of the Bill uses a vast array of legislative notes and examples to make 
substantive legal comments and clarifications. There are two main issues with this. Firstly, this 
drafting renders the Bill more complex and confusing at a time when plain English drafting is 
recognised as necessary to ensure public access to the laws that bind and protect them. Second, 
legislative notes do not have the same weight in interpreting statutes as do substantive provisions; 
 
32  See, eg, Tony Moore, ‘Gold Coast council recommends mosque, rejects 4am prayer time’, Brisbane Times 
(online at 10 September 2014) <https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/queensland/gold-coast-council-
recommends-mosque-rejects-4am-prayer-time-20140910-10exx5.html> . 
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they are not considered to be ‘part of’ an Act, and therefore are accorded far less interpretive 
weight.33 Therefore key clarifications, such as the religious body exceptions not altering the 
lawfulness of conduct under the SDA, may not be given effect by judicial decision-makers when 
interpreting this Bill. Legislative notes providing real-life examples should remain as legislative 
notes. 
Recommendation 18: Legislative notes and examples that make substantive legal 
comments and clarifications be converted into substantive provisions in the Bill. 
 
33  See Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 13(3)(a), 15AB. 
